to say but on how to frame one's address on an occasion such as this one, the occasion of remembering a friend and -though he would certainly have refused the title -a master, or perhaps I should say maître, a figure who resides somewhere between master and teacher, Alan Bray.
The difficulty of address -of whom to address, and how -is paramount on such occasions. "Speaking is impossible," Derrida insists, "but so too would be silence or absence or a refusal to share one's sadness." 2 Of course, pragmatically speaking, silence and absence are anything but impossible at moments like this. As Jeffrey Merrick wrote to me in the days following Alan's death, "Thinking back, I'm not sure we in LGBT studies have done a very good job of memorializing our pioneers. We should do better this time." 3 How exactly to do a better job, to work in the face of mourning, to allow our mourning to make our work better, has remained the animating impulse for this special issue. The specific work of this introduction, then, is to consider why mourning and memorialization constitute such exacting, such "confused and terrible" but also crucial and even occasionally pleasurable labor. It considers the particular difficulties attached to mourning a figure such as Alan Bray even as it takes up more generally the question, posed by Merrick, of why memorializing the founding figures of LGBT studies might entail specific difficulties. To do so, this introduction traverses material both pre-and postmodern in an effort to locate models that might assist in the job of paying tribute to a teacher, a scholar, and a friend who was also, and fundamentally, a scholar of the friend. Only after giving time to this more general and even historical interrogation will I turn -briefly here, as others do more fully in the essays that follow -to the work, and hence to the legacy, of Alan Bray himself.
As Derrida makes clear, and as contributors to this issue can no doubt attest, to know that one must speak -and speak publicly -on the occasion of the death of a friend and teacher is only the beginning and is of little help when it comes to the speaking itself. When those we memorialize are also pioneers, as Alan Bray indubitably was, the task is even more challenging, since, presumably, memorializing a pioneer partly entails recognizing not only the person and the work but the work's significance as a point of origin for others' work and, perhaps most important, for work that has yet to be done. Here I would shift the terminology slightly, insisting that we think of Alan less as a pioneer -one who maps out new territory, sometimes at the expense of those who already dwell there -than as a founder of a new field, one we might call "friendship studies," and as a reshaper of existing fields, including early modern gender studies and early modern English cultural history generally. Alan's work on friendship -in Homosexuality in Renaissance England, in "Homosexuality and the Signs of Male Friend-ship in Elizabethan England," and, most recently, in The Friend-has enabled a generation of scholars, many represented in this issue, to produce scholarship that would not otherwise have been possible. 4 Without him, "friendship studies"-a field that resolutely and carefully reads the history of friendship and the history of sexuality into, through, and across each other -might well not exist. Nonetheless, Bray's legacy is something of a rarity, since the task of memorializing the founders of academic fields usually falls to the founders' students. Unlike most such figures, Alan Bray did not hold an academic position, though he would find among scholars of early modern culture large numbers willing to identify him as their teacher and themselves as his students. In this anomalous instance, however, no one can lay an immediate claim to Alan's legacy by being among his "legitimate" academic "offspring."
The insistence of this familial and reproductive language in the vocabulary of memorialization is no accident; in fact, it may explain, at least in part, why scholars in LGBT studies, more than those in other fields, have found the territory of memorialization difficult, troubling, fraught. As nonheterosexual and nonreproductive persons all too often discover at the worst possible moment, death in the modern world tends to signify as a matter most immediately for the biological or state-sanctioned family. From hospital protocols to inheritance practices, from insurance claims to burial plots, death, more so now than ever, is a familial or, at best, a kinship affair. 5 Figuratively but no less powerfully, death -especially the death of writers, thinkers, and teachers -is represented and recognized in terms laden with the familial, some of which have already appeared in this introduction. Heirs, legacies, offspring, fathers and sons, and (much less frequently) mothers and daughters: this is the language in which death habitually finds representation.
Death offers yet another reminder of the extent to which queers, with their tangential, tendentious, or, more problematically, desiring but impossible relationship to the family form, exist in a realm outside the rituals that delimit and restrict social existence and, at the same time, make it legible, or even possible.
Other more material histories demand attention here, however, in our attempt to assess and, if necessary, respond to the anxiety that LGBT studies has had more trouble mourning its founders than other academic fields. Perhaps it is simply the newness of the field, the feeling that, as the latest of the major identitarian institutional discourses, lesbian and gay studies is too new, too young, to be ready to mourn its founders, even to have to watch them die at all. Our founders and teachers, we want to say, cannot be dying yet. We are only one generation into this project (there is the familial language again), and in so many institutions the field's existence has not even been acknowledged, let alone given the time and space and resources to have a presence and an impact on other knowledge projects, as well as be transformed by them. We cannot be dying so soon. Inevitably, the coincidence of academic LGBT or queer studies and the AIDS pandemic plummets into our consciousness, demanding that we recognize not only the number of scholars -both established and barely formed -whom we have lost to the disease but the ways in which the disease itself from the outset has burdened the project of LGBT studies with the task of mourning. 6 While this coterminous history suggests the extent to which the field has been, from the beginning, nothing but mourning, it may also encourage the acknowledgment that scholars in the field are exhausted from two decades of mourning; it may defiantly tell them, in the face of all that death, not to mourn but to organize, activate, write.
In the early documents of the field, the different voices and responses to death -to death by AIDS in particular -can be heard. One inescapable feature of living in a world transformed by AIDS -indeed, perhaps one of its few giftshas been the necessity of living, from a young age, with the dying, above all with the prospect not only that we might die but that we might have to survive the dying and death of our friends and colleagues. More often than not, the young die quickly, but AIDS gave a generation of young people, mostly men, and their friends the experience of preparing for death and of practicing both memorialization and survival. However excruciating that practice may have been, it allowed us to understand the work of mourning as a part of our critical function. In a passage that uncannily predicts the major questions posed by Derrida in the eulogies that make up The Work of Mourning, David Román acknowledges this critical capacity of mourning as he grapples with the fact that he lives on to memorialize the scholar Thomas E. Yingling, who died of AIDS in 1992 at the age of forty-two: "I am left wondering what means are available to me to speak with the dead -to claim an identification-without enacting the violence of misrecognition. Can there be recognition without violence? Is my mourning only a narcissistic performance of survival? Or, if I am speaking with the dead, who is listening and what is the response? All my profit lies in this asking." 7 For all of the reasons sketched out here, and no doubt for many more, scholars in LGBT studies have sometimes been tempted to turn away from asking such questions in order to shake off the sense that the entire field may be nothing more than "a narcissistic performance of survival." The challenge has been and remains, however, to imagine and then enact a "performance of survival" without undue narcissism -or, to put it another way, to craft what Robyn Wiegman calls "a politics of surviving." 8 In searching for an alternative language in which to figure a relationship to the deceased, in learning ways of speaking with the dead, scholars in LGBT studies and queers in general might do well to turn to the early modern discourse on friendship and mourning, a discourse that in turn, and in part unconsciously, inflects and informs Román's and Derrida's much more recent meditations on the obligations of mourning and survival. Among the benefits of these early modern models for "a politics of surviving" are their hesitation in figuring the loss of a friend or teacher as a familial matter, their acknowledgment of the ambivalence that attends any loss, and, perhaps above all, their frank assessment of the tendency of memorialization to collapse into the pathological narcissism identified by Román, so that the act of remembering becomes only a record of the survivor's loss and fails completely to recognize or give an account of the deceased's gifts, those things that live on in her or his absence. Within this tradition, in fact, the tendency to understand death exclusively in terms of loss is itself called into question as friends force themselves to find a language with which to acknowledge and celebrate both the gifts the deceased has left behind and those the survivors would like to return to the dead as part of their own process of living on. Of course, none of the ways of speaking with the dead friend, either in Renaissance friendship literature or in its more recent reconsiderations, is ultimately satisfactory. No matter how full of love, respect, and gratitude one may be for all the friend has given, the words ring false when spoken aloud, and perhaps more so when written. In his own reflection on the options for mourning, for instance, Derrida offers and rejects a set of them that are quite similar to those explored by Román. One is, he notes, tempted to give the moment over to the other, simply to quote, except that "this excess of fidelity would end up saying and exchanging nothing." Repeating the words of the dead gives nothing to the dead and adds nothing to the meager-seeming store of words left for those who mourn. Alternatively, one might speak of the deceased-describe and interpret the work, recount the life -yet then "one risks making him disappear again, as if one could add more death to death." 9 Speaking only of the friend, especially of a friend who produced so much influential language of his own, silences both the particularity of his words and the admirable familiarity of his work; that is, we do not need to be reminded what Alan Bray wrote, because we already know it so well. The final option, I suppose, would be to try to speak of ourselves, of the debt we owe Alan and of all we have learned from his work. Here too, immediately, the gesture is fraught with peril, not only because of its inevitable narcissism but because "in declaring these debts in such a manner, particularly when time is limited, one might seem to be putting an end to them, calculating what they amount to, pretending then to be able to . . . settle them in the very act of exposing them" (224).
Perhaps what binds all of these failed forms of memorialization is that they misunderstand the work of mourning, and hence of friendship, according to the structure of the debt rather than of the gift. Certainly, all of the valences I try to capture in the title of this issue, "The Work of Friendship," remain crucial to the project of memorialization and of survival: the psychic work, or working through, entailed in mourning; the celebration of the scholarly legacy, the published work, of the deceased; the labor of producing our own interrogations, assessments, and continuations of that work that is so much a part of marking the passage of a founder. Yet in all of this language of productive grieving, some part of the process of mourning can be sidestepped, as though we could produce work both to acquit our debts to our friends and teachers and to secure something that could make up for our loss. Some part of the practice of friendship, these models suggest, might entail not working at all, not trying to acquit the debt or retire the loss, but simply opening ourselves to the one who "is no longer there" and "will no longer respond," as Derrida says, even addressing ourselves to him or her, without the expectation of a response, of a return on our labor. All our profit, as Román notes, may simply lie in such an opening. What remains for me, then, but to try, as Derrida and Román both suggest, to speak to Alan, not in the mode of direct address, which could only seem absurd or kitschy, but elliptically, in the form of some severely truncated remarks about death and friendship, and especially about their intertwined histories? Much of this tradition would have been familiar to Alan (indeed, the directions I have taken in this introduction are traceable to him, and to those scholars who have followed him in the field of friendship studies), although the engagement with Derrida would have been less so. By swerving from Foucault-about whom Alan wrote and with whose own legacy he grappled -to Derrida, I know I am teasing Alan, pushing him a bit, taking him to places he might not have wanted to go, as he confessed to me once when we spoke of Derrida's writings on death and friendship. But I should say that at the time of this writing I have not read Alan's last book, so that these words may turn out to be little more than an echo of what he has already written -written, specifically, about friendship and about death. This is a risk I am willing to take, precisely because my work has so often seemed simply to echo Alan's that the experience would be, after all, nothing new, and might even constitute a form of consolation.
There is a further risk -no, not a risk but a veritable impossibilityattached to this turn to the early modern friendship tradition as a means of learning to memorialize Alan. That impossibility lies in the fact that Alan was a man but I am not, and so, by virtue of an accident of biography I would not otherwise feel compelled to expose, I cannot, in the classical friendship tradition, even begin to claim Alan as my friend, let alone step forward to mourn him publicly. 10 Women have no part in the friendship tradition; if anything, women are, by virtue of their constitutive shortcomings (of mind, of soul, of spirit), the reason there needs to be a masculine friendship tradition at all. For a woman to step forward and speak at such a moment, for a woman to try to do the work of friendship at all, is nothing short of absurd, as the resolutely masculinist tones of the essays that follow make clear. Here, too, it is worth recognizing, delicately, how the inextricability of the history of LGBT or queer studies from the history of AIDS has sometimes left the field's female practitioners in a difficult position, especially when it comes to mourning. This was most acutely felt in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in public forums such as conferences and talks, which invariably seemed to begin with a necrology and in which every paper was at least partly a performance of survival. For women in the field, participating in those performances sometimes felt like an indecorous intrusion. The history of publications in the field, of course, tells a different story, with scholars such as Cindy Patton and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick at the forefront of the field's engagement with the presence of AIDS, in the United States and beyond, as participants in the crisis as well as documenters of it. 11 We might think also of Wiegman's volume for Yingling, in which the interlocutors are all male but the editor and compiler is a woman. In this volume, as in the present issue, the death of a friend offers the opportunity to mourn, to write, and to survive, to map out a practice of mourning that is also one of survival.
And so to the work of friendship. Continuing a project he initiated in Politics of Friendship, Derrida announces in The Work of Mourning, in what might at first glance seem characteristically, infuriatingly hyperbolic terms, that true friendship always begins with the anticipation of the death of the friend. Long before any hint of death, he insists, friendship must be recognized as an exercise in preparing to mourn: "To have a friend, to look at him, to follow him with your eyes, to admire him in friendship is to know in a more intense way, already injured, always insistent, and more and more unforgettable, that one of the two of you will inevitably see the other die." 12 The risk of friendship lies in the necessity that one of you will be left behind to mourn. As macabre as this vision of friendship may seem, however, it is precisely the inevitability of the death of the friend that, according to Derrida, gives to friendship what Jeffrey Masten, in this issue, terms its "sweetness." Without "the anguished apprehension of mourning," Derrida writes in Politics of Friendship, "the act of friendship would not spring forth in its very energy." 13 Lest this understanding of the idiom of friendship seem perverse, and per-versely postmodern, it is worth noting that all of the great pre-and early modern discourses on the subject concern themselves fundamentally with the question of death. Almost all of these writings, in fact, are precipitated by the death of the friend. Thus Montaigne, in John Florio's translation of "De l'amitié," tries to articulate the singularity of his friendship with Etienne de La Boétie by describing his deep and persistent mourning following La Boétie's death. Unable after many pages to find words capable of certifying the depth of that friendship, Montaigne turns to an account of the effects on him of his companion's death: "Since the time I lost him . . . I doe but languish, I doe but sorrow: and even those pleasures, all things present me with, in stead of yeelding me comfort, doe but redouble the griefe of his losse. We were copartners in all things. All things were with us at halfe; me thinkes [sic] I have stolne his parte from him. . . . I was so accustomed to be ever two, and so enured to be never single, that me thinks I am but halfe my selfe." 14 So acute is Montaigne's grief in these lines that, ignoring one of the cardinal rules of friendship, he actually forgets to mourn his friend, speaking only of himself, lost as he is in his own lamentation. By so losing himself, he demonstrates that he has not read carefully enough -or has perhaps forgotten -Cicero's De amicitia, the greatest Roman precursor to his own literary effort, a work that is itself concerned as much with death as it is with friendship, and in particular with the appropriate posture to take with respect to the death of a friend. Perhaps it is Cicero whom Montaigne has in mind when he complains that "the discourses, which sterne antiquitie hath left us concerning [friendship], seeme to me but faint and forcelesse in respect of the feeling I have of it" (208). It remains to be seen whether Montaigne's dismissal of the affective impoverishment of existing writings on friendship does justice to Cicero's carefully calibrated, distinctly Derridean discussion of the work of mourning. Cicero's treatise, once again, begins with the death of a friend, Scipio Africanus, the protagonist Laelius's companion. In his opening remarks, as though readers might doubt his sincerity, Laelius insists, "I do indeed grieve!" Yet he also announces that he will not allow himself to be incapacitated by this grieving, as Montaigne apparently is. "To be crushed by grief at one's own misfortunes," Laelius counsels, "is the act not of a man who loves his friend, but of one who loves himself." 15 The real test of friendship, the real work of friendship, is to rise up in one's grief to remember the friend who has died, to do him justice in the world he has left by remembering his deeds, his virtue, and, above all, his words. For Cicero, through Laelius, whatever value there is in friendship derives from the acts of remembering -of memorializing -that one friend bestows on the other in the form of a gift that benefits both the deceased and the survivor: "Now friendship possesses many splendid advantages, but of course the finest thing of all about it is that it sends a ray of good hope into the future, and keeps our hearts from faltering or falling by the wayside. . . . [Friends] live on after they have died, so great is the honor that follows them, so vivid the memory, so poignant the sorrow." The memory of a friend ties us to the past, but the activity, the practice, of mourning catapults us into the future, illuminating the way and giving purpose to our lives. "That is why," Laelius concludes, "friends who have died are accounted happy, and those who survive are deemed worthy of praise" (56). This recuperation of the experience of death as an essential part of the practice of friendshipa recuperation that promises equal benefit to both parties-makes clear the degree to which the work of friendship, in pre-and early modern texts, is inseparable from the practice of mourning and the practice of survival.
Thus the essence of friendship, as Derrida has predicted, can be found in the anticipation as well as in the experience of mourning. Unfortunate as such an arrangement undoubtedly appears, the most "splendid advantage" of friendship, "the finest thing of all about it," can be experienced only postmortem, which is to say, it cannot be experienced as a condition of friendship at all. We can anticipate the pleasure that being mourned by our friend will bring us or, alternatively, the pleasure and honor we will bring to our friend in mourning and memorializing him, but we cannot, in the end, actually be present together at the moment when that essence of friendship is realized. Francis Bacon, my last avatar of the friendship tradition, captures this not quite promise of friendship in his own short disquisition on the subject when he describes what, for him, is the most important of friendship's "fruits":
The best way to represent to life the manifold use of friendship is to cast and see how many things there are which a man cannot do himself, and then it will appear that it was a sparing speech of the ancients, to say, that a friend is another himself, for that a friend is far more than himself. Men have their time, and die many times in desire of some things which they principally take to heart: the bestowing of a child, the finishing of a work, or the like. If a man have a true friend, he may rest almost secure that the care of those things will continue after him. 16 "Almost secure." This, perhaps, is the most that friendship can offer us in life, at least those of us who will not live to memorialize our friends. For those of us who do survive, the ethical dimension of our practices of memorialization turns back on THE WORK OF FRIENDSHIP that "almost," on the promise, the duty, of work that will be carried on after the friend's death. Bacon identifies the duty of the survivor, in what remains a deeply fraught, if evocative, equivalence, as "the bestowing of a child, the finishing of a work." The question of the dead friend's work -the work that remains to be completed, the duty to continue that work -in fact appears with surprising frequency in the documents of the friendship tradition. Montaigne notes at the opening of "De l'amitié," for instance, that it is he himself whom La Boétie, "by his last will and testament, left with so kinde remembrance, heire and executor of his librarie and writings." Cicero's Laelius, too, speaks of the "perennial enthusiasm for study and learning" he shared with Scipio, which "is how we spent all our time when we were out of the public eye." 17 Otherwise insupportable, Laelius's sorrow is made bearable by his memory of these shared hours of study and, presumably, by his continued study and learning in his friend's absence. One of friendship's consolations, then, the survival of the friend's work after his death, is also, especially for Bacon, one of its highest duties: to continue that work and even, if only as an aspiration, to complete it.
It is in this transformation of mourning into the practice of thinking and writing and carrying on the friend's work that, I believe, the slippage between friend and master can be seen to lie. The death of a friend whose work we take it on ourselves to continue changes what may have been a horizontal relationship into a vertical one as we begin to take account of what the friend gave us in life as a legacy left to us in his or her absence, a legacy from which we can learn, over and over again, new lessons that we may not have fully appreciated or comprehended during the friend's life. This is one of the duties and consolations left to some of Alan's friends, most notably Mark D. Jordan, after his death: the opportunity to assist in the completion and publication of Alan's last work, The Friend, reviewed in this issue by Carla Freccero and discussed at some length by Valerie Traub. 18 This work, as his friend Stephen Gee wrote in an obituary in the Guardian, "explores same sex kinship ceremonies and unions that permeated the culture of premodern societies. A particular focus is on joint tombs inscribed with declarations of love." 19 Alan's last work, then, is about the work of mourning and the work of friendship, the work of mourning that is the work of friendship.
As excited as I am to see this work, as eager, even greedy, as I am to study it, knowing that Alan will not write again, something in me refuses the description of it as his last work, even if I must read it as his last words. One place to turn for a means of articulating this refusal is Alan's afterword to the 1995 edition of Homosexuality in Renaissance England, a work we are now at liberty to think of as the first installment of his multivolume opus on same-sex relations in early modern England. Reflecting on the directions that work in this field had taken in the thirteen years since the book's initial publication, Alan wrote, "One of the tests of a book is not how many questions it answers but how many it prompts." 20 Alan's book has prompted more questions than we can count, questions that have helped open up the field of which he is indeed a pioneer. These questions have been beautifully and eloquently asked, and sometimes answered, by all those scholars and teachers whose work has been touched and inspired by Alan's. Those of us in this category will continue to be indebted to Alan and will continue his work in what will remain for me, as it does for Bacon, the bittersweet task of surviving and the real work of friendship itself. I take solace from the fact that in this work I am not alone and am following in Alan's footsteps in even more ways than I knew, as I have learned from Gee's obituary. According to Gee, while exploring the burial monuments and inscriptions that make up much of the work of The Friend, "Alan realized his research was also a personal act of remembrance and mourning for friends lost to AIDS." 21 Researching, writing, and mourning to the last, Alan left us yet another model for how to do the work of friendship, both now and in the future.
In Memoriam
The essays collected in this issue appear in the wake of the sudden and premature death in 2001, at the age of fifty-three, of Alan Bray. His death deprived AngloAmerican early modern gay and lesbian studies, both historical and literary, of one of its founding figures. Bray's best-known work, Homosexuality in Renaissance England, paved the way for subsequent scholars, many of them writing in this issue, by making two foundational claims: first, that same-sex desire has a history that can be reconstructed, but second, that we cannot fully know in advance, in particular from the perspective of modern homosexuality, what the object is whose history we are trying to write. As Bray put it in the preface to the 1995 edition of his book, gay and lesbian scholars are in the unenviable position of writing "a history of an aspect of sexuality whose expression has varied radically across different cultures and societies." 22 Like Foucault, then, and unlike John Boswell, on whose work his own nonetheless draws, Bray's legacy is above all one of defamiliarization; it challenges us to leave aside preconceived notions about the very categories we are attempting to historicize, in order to track the varying expressions of sexuality across time.
As if to provide a model for the historiographical method he proposed in the book, Bray in 1990 published "Homosexuality and the Signs of Male Friendship in Elizabethan England." In this possibly even more influential work, ubiquitously cited in new work on early modern sexualities and sociabilities, Bray proposed that we focus on two related, though seemingly mutually exclusive, discourses in Renaissance England -sodomy and friendship -in order to reconsider the relationship of each to what would become modern homosexuality. As Bray convincingly demonstrated, these discourses are both "utterly confused" (in Foucault's well-known phrase) and utterly fused, bound together by the definitional insistence that they never coincide. 23 Bray's work, which most immediately inspired work by such scholars of early modern friendship as Jonathan Goldberg and Jeffrey Masten, has come under further and fruitful scrutiny recently in volumes by George E. Haggerty, Laurie Shannon, and Valerie Traub. 24 At the time of his death Bray was working on a new book, ultimately titled The Friend, that concerned, among other things, alternative unions recognized by the Catholic church in so-called friendship blessings, as well as the practice of public coburial for friends, especially friends of the same sex, which was allowed by some churches in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This book draws not only on Bray's scholarly preoccupations but on his lifelong commitment to activism on behalf of gay men and lesbians in the English Catholic church. It promises to contribute not only to a general history of the intertwined discourses of friendship and mourning but to a reimagination of the possibilities attached to harnessing the state's interest in death for nonnormative, even queer, ends. Wherever one comes down on the gay marriage debates, there is something interesting, even salutary, in Bray's willingness to pair partnership rituals, organized around the church's and the state's interest in sustaining the couple form in life, with rituals associated with death. Certainly, the latter still insist on participation in a couple to sanction social existence; nonetheless, a queer politics that takes seriously the matter of death partnership as well as the matter of life partnership is a step in the right direction. More important, deploying friendship as a matter for both church and state scrutiny, while it threatens to expose still more domains of private life to institutional interference, throws a wrench into the works of a state that insists on knowing something definitive about the sexual lives of the couples it sanctions. "We have chosen to live and die as friends," these rituals and monuments announce. "What more do you need to know?" An issue memorializing Bray's life and work might have been assembled according to a number of alternative strategies suggested and enabled by his unique career as a scholar and an activist and by his many contributions to lesbian and gay liberation struggles. For most of his adult life Bray worked as a civil servant, undertaking his scholarly work without institutional support or resources. Moreover, he was a prominent public activist and voice for gay and lesbian issues, not only in the church but in British public life as well. He was a member of the Gay Liberation Front, a founding member of the Gay Christian movement, a member of the Gay News Defence Committee, and a spokesman for the Gay Activist's Alliance, which attacked the Guardian's homophobic coverage of the 1979 London Gay Pride March. As a scholar, he helped organize the Gay History Group and was a member of the editorial collective of the History Workshop Journal, a forum for socialist and feminist historians. Seamlessly throughout his life and work, then, Bray made possible not only the scholarship of a younger generation of gay and lesbian historians in Britain, but the very conditions of possibility for gay and lesbian public and political life in that nation.
In the United States, however, Bray's most memorable legacy is, perforce, his work, which continues to be read and taught, especially by historians and literary critics in early modern fields. As recent publications by Shannon, Traub, and others show, moreover, we may not have even begun to come to terms with the full implications of Bray's contribution to early modern scholarship. In particular, scholars are only now beginning to push the parameters and to identify certain limitations of Bray's oeuvre, provoking the development of new models for studying the varying expressions of intimacy, sociality, and sexuality that he so thoroughly demonstrated to be characteristic of the early modern period.
The present issue showcases work of this nature by calling on prominent scholars already known for their engagement with early modern sexualities in general and, in some cases, with Bray's work in particular. For this occasion, these scholars were asked to think again about Bray's contribution (or lack thereof) to their work and, above all, to test its applicability in fields in which it has not been primarily employed. Thus some of these essays explore friendships or intimacies between women or between men and women. Others deal with geographic locations outside Bray's heavily English focus, including France and the Low Countries. Still others test the applicability of Bray's theories to periods beyond the Renaissance. Finally, all of these essays assemble evidence from archives -literary, philological, visual -that expand the purview of Bray's work. Attentive to Bray's legacy and demonstrating a full range of current theoretical models for dealing with the history of sexuality, these essays also look to the future of early modern lesbian, gay, queer, and gender studies, a future of which Bray's work will undoubtedly continue to be a part.
Because not all of the essays speak directly or consistently to the content of Bray's work, the issue explores more extensively than it might do otherwise the range of techniques for memorialization, not all of which demand a direct address. Two essays do not cite Bray's oeuvre at all; instead, each acknowledges and attempts to articulate its status as a response to the loss of a teacher and friend. "Love and Loss: An Elegy," George E. Haggerty's beautiful and wrenching tribute to his lover, Philip Brett, explores the consolations offered to the bereaved by the elegy tradition, a body of poetry specifically engaged with the work of mourning. For Haggerty, who attempts to find ways both to articulate and to recognize the shattering that comes through loss, the elegy moves back and forth between consolation and the failure of it. Even as he finds solace in the words of poets -Thomas Gray foremost among them -who have suffered unimaginable losses and have to some degree eroticized them, Haggerty notes the extent to which the physicality of loss, the fact of losing touch with the body of the beloved, can find no place in poetry, in memory, or in language. Despite the failure of the elegy fully to console, however, Haggerty offers the genre to us, along with his account of his own mourning, "as an act of love and loss"-or as a gift of the beloved, the body of the beloved as corpus, so that we, too, might find some consolation in our loss.
Stephen Orgel's "Ganymede Agonistes," with its naughty review of the iconography of love and lust in portraits of Ganymede, is similarly elliptical in its relationship to Bray's work and to his death. Orgel simply states at the outset, in a wonderfully enlivening aside, that Bray himself read the essay and, after doing so, counseled Orgel to "be more outrageous." This vignette, made more remarkable for those who knew Alan by his own distinctive lack of outrageousness, at least in his public self-presentation, reminds us, first, of his supreme dedication as a reader of his colleagues' and friends' work and, second, of his sometimes hidden playfulness, which many of us may have missed. Perhaps, too, there is something to knowing that Alan read this essay, as he also read versions of Traub's contribution and heard Masten's, and perhaps others, and commented on them, as though his words or gestures were tangible in these essays, both where they are acknowledged and where they are not.
Traub's contribution, "Friendship's Loss: Alan Bray's Making of History," is the most considered assessment of Bray's scholarly career, from his earliest writings to The Friend. As Traub incisively notes, identifying two of the key features that rendered his work so influential, Bray is the "scholar who has done more, perhaps, than any other to return the body of the friend, and with it the complex meanings of intimacy, to historical consciousness." Remembered most often as a founding figure in the history of sexuality, Bray nonetheless ought to be recognized, Traub notes, as a scholar who relentlessly insisted on the unknowability of the relationship between the sexual and the intimate, as a scholar who attended as carefully to "what is left out" as to what is found in the archive of the history of male intimacy. To put it another way, Bray brought us the body of the friend so we would remember that the friend had a body, not so we could know what he did with it. At times, in fact, Bray seemed willfully silent or evasive on the question of sex. Surely one of the most fitting tributes we can offer a dead friend is to read and reread, minutely, critically, and urgently, the work she or he has left behind. This is the offering Traub makes in her essay, a reading of the span of Bray's scholarly legacy that will push us to read more, and better, in the future.
The question of unknowability resurfaces in Goldberg's essay, "Margaret Cavendish, Scribe," which takes us into the archive to consider questions of desire and writing, of the ways in which desire is animated in writing and in handwriting in particular. Here again, the body plays a crucial role: Cavendish's hand conspires both to represent and to produce the split subject she finds herself to beor, as Goldberg puts it, "a figure for whom desire splits rather than resolves relations between inner and outer, self and society." Goldberg takes issue with histories of early modern sexuality that understand themselves, or can be understood, as genealogies of modern identitarian categories, that read the "success" or "failure" of historical persons by assessing the coherence of their self-understanding and self-description as singularly desiring subjects. By focusing on the contradictions of desire, on what he calls "the open secret of the imbrication of alternative possibilities within normative sexualities," Goldberg gives us, as he has consistently done throughout his work, "a queer story" that throws into question the triumphalism of a certain version of lesbian and gay historiography and undermines the liberal narrative of a progressively unified subject with which that triumphalism -no matter how liberatory it aspires to be -is hopelessly infected. By giving us back desire-and a resolutely embodied desire-as the necessary lens through which to read the contingent histories of intimacy, affect, sexuality, and writing, Goldberg reminds us to take note of those features of Bray's work that may be overlooked when we revere him as a master and, above all, to be aware of those places where he is willing not to know, or not to insist on finding in the past, an instantly recognizable precursor to the present we think we know.
The remaining three essays address the topic of male friendship through an exploration of literary forms -poems, letters, a novel, plays -that both dramatize and perform the work of friendship. Merrick's essay, "Male Friendship in Prerevolutionary France," attends to some of the difficulties associated with writing a history of friendship, given its elusive and ephemeral qualities. Merrick offers a crucial assessment of some of Alan Bray's signal contributions to the history of friendship by noting temporal and national differences between sixteenth-and seventeenth-century England and eighteenth-century France. He forces us to consider whether Bray's work speaks to "early modern friendship" in general or to English friendship in particular. Most notably, Merrick suggests, as does Bray, that the traditional model on which classical friendship was predicated -a model based on difference in both age and status, a difference that ostensibly lined up with sexual acts and positions -changed from 1600 to 1900, but he insists that the new models of male friendship differed throughout Europe. Whereas in Renaissance England "Bray found more sexual fluidity within less social flexibility," for instance, the French case was quite the reverse. In addition, in the texts that make up Merrick's archive, "subjective differences in disposition" come to characterize male friendship as insistently as differences in age and status once did. Such differences in disposition distract from but also reproduce the subjective differences between men and women that are seen to drive men into the arms, or at least the company, of other men in the first place. Friendship here constitutes a temporary refuge from compulsory heterosexuality rather than simply an alternative to it, in a formulation that forces us once again to read the history of friendship, in Sedgwick's famous articulation, in a universalizing rather than a minoritizing frame. 25 Shannon's "Poetic Companies: Musters of Agency in George Gascoigne's 'Friendly Verse' " approaches the history of male friendship through the multiple careers of the "rascal" poet, soldier, debtor, and friend Gascoigne. Like Merrick, Shannon is interested in exploring how difference, especially status difference, both structures and interferes with the production of affinities between and among men. For Shannon, however, the most salient forms of difference afflicting male friendship in the sixteenth century are microdifferences among men who are "neither true equals nor drastically vertically distinguished." In the world of letters and the world of war, the literary and martial domains, men in this period worked, often in a nostalgic vein, to represent and inhabit imagined homosocial communities capable of producing both a distinctive collective culture, composed of martial and poetic "companies," and versions of "personhood" distinct from (though enabled by) the collective. For Shannon, these twin aims of masculine sociability -to produce the person as well as the company -find a fascinating analogue in Gascoigne's strategy of authorship, which moves back and forth between collaborative and individuating models of authorial personhood. With this contribution to both the history of friendship and the history of authorship, Shannon draws and expands on Bray's work by exposing the degree to which early modern male friendship was not only lived but self-consciously crafted by its sixteenth-century practitioners.
If Shannon begins her essay by exploring how early modern men wrote themselves into a friendship tradition, Masten starts from two different but equally suggestive places: first, the way in which modern readers of early modern texts have sometimes tried to write those texts out of a troubling and unstable discourse about friendship altogether; and second, the way in which early modern men found themselves hailed, made, and incorporated by what Masten calls "queer address." His essay, "Toward a Queer Address: The Taste of Letters and Early Modern Male Friendship," explores the recurrence of the words sweet and friend in a range of early modern texts, including Hamlet and Edward II, and wonders how those words might have "tasted" to the eyes, ears, and tongues of early modern readers and audiences. Mapping out a cross-temporal, philological, synesthetic critical practice, Masten tries to savor the address of a friend as it would have been heardliterally, subsumed or taken into his body -by another friend in the sixteenth century. Between Masten's insistence that we play with the possibility of embodying the sweetness of early modern friendship and Haggerty's demand that we allow ourselves to feel the bodily anguish of friendship's loss, these essays force us to acknowledge the pleasures as well as the pains entailed both in the work of friendship and in the practice of speaking with the dead. That these experiments take place "at the very point where words fail us," as Derrida puts it, is both one of the many difficulties and one of the greatest gifts of opening ourselves to such exacting but undeniably sweet work.
Notes

